Imitation is the Backbone of Culture Emily Rodriguez   © Copyright 2023 by Emily Rodriguez

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Social nonconformity is crucial in the advancement of societies, but there is irony in the fact that imitation is the backbone of skill learning. Imitation is the foundation for culture to develop, but it is merely a starting point (Dean et al., 2012).

As infants, humans reveal neonatal imitation. They'll copy the facial gestures of the people around them. Human babies are not the only ones to do this however. Young chimpanzees and macaque monkeys do just the same. But behavior like this isn’t for the sake of impersonation. Imitation is survival. Infants show others that they are alert, oftentimes striking a maternal chord (Bates & Byrne, 2010). So how do humans and animals achieve something as complicated as culture from the simple imitation of infants? Culture, essentially, occurs when individuals here and there, far and wide, learn from the actions of one another until those actions transfigure into customs and traditions (Whiten et al., 2011).

Based on this definition, we know that humans absolutely have culture, but we quite easily find that we are not the only species to make use of imitation. The foraging techniques and tool use of our ancestors amount to tradition and are easily observable in other species (Whiten et al., 2011). Underwater, humpback whales create circular walls of bubbles and flowing water in order to trap large groups of fish (Waal, 2017). And in northern Congo, chimps use 2 kinds of sticks to hunt termites. The thicker one makes a hole into termite mounds, while the thinner stick is used to fish for termites (Bates & Byrne, 2010). Although humans are now more increasingly ready to accept the abundance of culture in nature, imitation has had its own turbulent history (Waal, 2017).

In order to separate ourselves from animals, scientists had to first define culture. Then they reasoned that in order for culture to arise, imitation had to take place (Waal, 2017). What followed, was defining imitation. With certainty we could say that imitation is used by humans and animals alike to learn without wasting time on trial-and-error. But we also knew that imitation was important for learning social skills (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). However, the general thought was that “if we can prove that imitation is unique in humans, culture can be too” (Waal, 2017).

We’ve established that animals exhibit imitation, so a category just for humans should be called true imitation. True imitation is defined as the intentional or selective imitation for some goal or purpose (Waal, 2017), oftentimes also called selective imitation (Bates & Byrne, 2010). This meant that some of the copying animals exhibited would not fit into this category. True imitation demanded insight and comprehension, which we really really hoped would be uniquely human. What we didn’t expect was that chimps make excellent examples of true imitators.

When up against human children, young chimps of a similar mental age were able to shortcut the path to reward through insight into the steps of the process. Meanwhile, human children copied all steps, even those not so necessary (Waal, 2017). These insights are known well by Horner and Whiten (2005) in their study titled Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens).

The participants of this study included twelve chimps from the Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary in Uganda. All wild-born and living in a forest setting, aged 2 to 6. In addition to sixteen nursery school children from the UK, aged 3 to 4.

Young chimps and children were presented with 2 box types: an opaque black box and a clear box. Each box having 2 levels, the top one being empty and the bottom one containing a reward. The experimenter modeled the steps to obtain the reward: first using a tool to tap the cylinder on the top of the box… then moving it out of the way to reveal an opening to the empty top-level… which is then pointlessly poked into. The experimenter then moves to the front of the box, using a tool to move the door out of the way, revealing another opening… and using the tool to reach into it and pull out the reward.

Young chimps given a turn on the opaque box, unable to see the empty top level, follow the steps exactly. However, a clear box reveals an empty top level, and the chimp copies only the steps needed to reach the reward. Meanwhile, children copied all steps regardless of box type. Meaning that in this case, chimps are the group exhibiting true imitation, which involves the intentional selection of steps.

But children this age should’ve shown true imitation, and they do, just not in this particular instance. A smaller pilot study revealed that some of the kids thought they were playing a game based on how well they could copy each step (Horner & Whiten, 2004). Perhaps experimenters said too much, were too kind, or led the child to believe that they were playing said game.

This study doesn’t mock children, our original inspiration for true imitation. It describes how chimps can also easily be true imitators (Waal, 2017). And although counting the ways in which we are superior to non-human animals is far from a respectable science, it is on occasion ego that drives discovery.

Recall neonatal imitation. This requires mirror neurons making up the mirror neuron system (MNS) for this type of imitation and many others (Bates & Byrne, 2010). Essentially, they are neurons that fire when both an action is occurring and again when that same action is being observed (Molenberghs et al., 2009). And despite crossing our fingers that they are unique to humans, they were actually discovered in macaques, a type of primate (Bates & Byrne, 2010)!

In macaques, two areas were identified: area F5 and area PF. It is believed that in humans, area F5 is equivalent to the pars opercularis, or Brodmann area 44 (BA 44), at the front of the brain in the posterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (Molenberghs et al., 2009). And area PF in humans would be equivalent to the rostral inferior parietal lobule (IPL), to the side of the brain (Molenberghs et al., 2009). Both regions connect and form the frontoparietal MNS (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). But a third region might also be considered.

Iacoboni and Dapretto (2006) identified the IFG, IPL, and now a region that provides visual input: the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) as part of the “core circuit” of imitation. But imitation is so vast that these regions don’t encompass all types. More complex forms of imitation, such as imitation learning and social mirroring require still the use of other areas (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006).

A culmination of studies questions the role of the pars opercularis, or BA 44. Finding that Brodmann area 6 (BA 6) of the premotor cortex experienced activation significantly more often concerning imitation. It should also be mentioned however that the two areas are directly next to each other (Molenberghs et al., 2009). BA 44 might be less involved in imitation than other claims have stated, but it is still important considering its role in execution timing (Molenberghs et al., 2009). As for BA 6, there are significantly more clusters of mirror neurons (Molenberghs et al., 2009).

But there are further differences between the dorsal and ventral sides of the pars opercularis (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). Mirror neurons in the dorsal region were activated when an action was imitated and when it was observed. While neurons in the ventral region activated only when an action was copied by the observer, but not when it was solely observed, therefore, these neurons did not mirror.

But we must also mention Broca’s area. It is another region found in the frontal lobe and happens to encompass Brodmann areas 44 and 45, and we can safely say that BA 44 has some implications in imitation.

Broca’s area is responsible mainly for speech. An rTMS study, a form of noninvasive brain stimulation, allowed researchers to produce a temporary lesion and study the temporary changes that came with it (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). When the posterior part of Broca’s area, encompassing the pars opercularis, was temporarily lesioned, imitation was impaired (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). Further supporting the importance of the pars opercularis. But, these results additionally support the hypothesis that claim mirror neurons might have been involved in the evolution of language (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006).

The MNS does not abstractly recognize actions, but is capable of coding for intention. The MNS can distinguish when a food item is picked up to be eaten or when it is picked up to be placed somewhere else.

Mirror neurons that were known to go off to watching an experimenter pick up an object to eat, correspondingly activated the most when primates themselves also picked up an object to eat versus when they picked up an object to move it (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006).

Imitation has been a long road, and it matters: providing insight into our survivability and our mental capabilities. Social nonconformity is crucial in the advancement of societies, but there is irony in the fact that imitation is the backbone of skill learning. Imitation is the foundation for culture to develop, but it is merely a starting point (Dean et al., 2012).

References

Bates, L. A., & Byrne, R. W. (2010). Imitation: what animal imitation tells us about animal cognition. WIREs Cognitive Science, 1(5), 685–695. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.77

Dean, L. G., Kendal, R. L., Schapiro, S. J., Thierry, B., & Laland, K. N. (2012). Identification of the Social and Cognitive Processes Underlying Human Cumulative Culture. Science, 335(6072), 1114–1118. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1213969

Horner, V., & Whiten, A. (2004). Causal knowledge and imitation/emulation switching in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and children (Homo sapiens). Animal Cognition, 8(3), 164–181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0239-6

Iacoboni, M., Dapretto, M. The mirror neuron system and the consequences of its dysfunction. Nat Rev Neurosci 7, 942–951 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2024

Molenberghs, P., Cunnington, R., & Mattingley, J. B. (2009). Is the mirror neuron system involved in imitation? A short review and meta-analysis. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 33(7), 975–980. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.03.010

Waal, D. F. (2017). Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (Illustrated). W. W. Norton & Company.

Whiten, A., Hinde, R. A., Laland, K. N., & Stringer, C. B. (2011). Culture evolves. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366(1567), 938–948. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0372